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This paper reports a detailed cryptanalysis of a recently proposed encryption scheme based on
the logistic map. Some problems are emphasized concerning the key space definition and the imple-
mentation of the cryptosystem using floating-point operations. It is also shown how it is possible
to reduce considerably the key space through a ciphertext-only attack. Moreover, a timing attack
allows the estimation of part of the key due to the existent relationship between this part of the
key and the encryption/decryption time. As a result, the main features of the cryptosystem do not
satisfy the demands of secure communications. Some hints are offered to improve the cryptosystem
under study according to those requirements.
Recently a new cryptosystem was proposed by
using a chaotic map lattice (CML). In this paper,
we analyze the security of this cryptosystem and
point out some of its security defects. A number
of measures have been suggested to enhance the
security of the cryptosystem following some es-
tablished guidelines on how to design good cryp-
tosystems with chaos.
I. INTRODUCTION
Image encryption is somehow different from text en-
cryption due to some inherent features of images, such
as bulk data capacity and high correlation among pixels.
Therefore, digital chaotic ciphers like those in [3, 4, 5] and
traditional cryptographic techniques such as DES, IDEA
and RSA are no longer suitable for practical image en-
cryption, especially for real-time communication scenar-
ios. So far, many chaos-based image cryptosystems have
been proposed [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. The major core of these en-
cryption systems consists of one or several chaotic maps
serving the purpose of either just encrypting the image
or shuffling the image and subsequently encrypting the
resulting shuffled image. In [1] a new image encryption
algorithm based on chaotic map lattices has been pro-
posed. The aim of this paper is to assess the security of
such cryptosystem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the cryptosystem introduced in [1]. After that,
Section III points out some design problems inherent to
that cryptosystem, and Section IV gives some attacks
on the cryptosystem under study. Finally, some security
enhancements are presented in Section V followed by the
last section, which presents the conclusions.
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II. DESCRIPTION OF THE ENCRYPTION
SCHEME
The encryption scheme described in [1] is based on the
logistic map given by
xi+1 = a · xi · (1 − xi). (1)
For a certain value of a, the chaotic phase space is
[xmin, xmax].
Given an M ×N color image with R, G, B color com-
ponents, an initialization process is performed to con-
vert the integer values of each pixel to real numbers that
can work with the above chaotic logistic map. First,
the 2-D image is scanned in the raster order (i.e., from
left to right and from top to bottom) to form three 1-
D integer sequences {P ic}
m
i=1 (c = R, G and B), where
P ic ∈ {0, · · · , 255} denotes the color component c of the
i-th pixel. Then, the integer sequences are converted to
three real-number sequences each of which corresponds
to a different color component: {xic(0)}
m
i=1, where
xic(0) = xmin + (xmax − xmin) · P
i
c/255. (2)
After the above initialization process, the following en-
cryption procedure is carried out separately for each color
component to obtain the ciphertext:
1. Set r = 1.
2. Set the initial condition of the logistic map as fol-
lows:
x0 =
{
xmc (r − 1), if i = 1,
xi−1c (r), if 2 ≤ i ≤ m.
3. Iterate the chaotic logistic map from x0 for n times
to obtain xn.
4. Set xic(r) = xn + x
i
c(r − 1). If x
i
c(r) > xmax, then
subtract (xmax−xmin) from x
i
c(r) to ensure x
i
c(r) ∈
[xmin, xmax].
25. Set r = r + 1. If r < j, go to Step 2; otherwise
the encryption procedure stops for the current color
component.
After performing the above encryption procedure
for all three color components, the three sequences
{xiR(j)}
m
i=1, {x
i
G(j)}
m
i=1 and {x
i
B(j)}
m
i=1 make up the ci-
phertext.
As claimed in [1], the secret key is composed of the
following four sub-keys:
1. The control parameter of the logistic map, i.e., a.
2. The image height and the image width, i.e., M and
N respectively.
3. The number of chaotic iterations in Step 3, i.e., n.
4. The number of cycles, i.e., j.
The decryption procedure is similar to the above de-
scription, but in an reverse order, and the following in-
verse map
P ic = round[(x
i
c(0)− xmin) · 255/(xmax − xmin)] (3)
is used in the last step to recover the plain-image by
converting real numbers back to integer pixel values.
For more details about the encryption/decryption pro-
cedures, the reader is referred to [1].
III. DESIGN PROBLEMS
A. Key definition problems
Following Kerckhoffs’ principle [11], the security of a
cryptosystem should depend only on its key. For the
cryptosystem defined in [1], the size of the image to be
encrypted determines one of its four secret sub-keys. In a
known-plaintext attack we have access to both the plain
image and its encrypted version, which means that we
know the size of the image. Moreover, in a ciphertext-
only attack the value m = M × N is known and it is
possible to get M if N is known and vice versa. There-
fore, it is not a good idea to include the size of the image
as part of the key, since it does not increase the difficulty
to break the cryptosystem.
In addition, the control parameter a of the logistic map
is also part of the key. In [1] a is chosen in (3.57, 4) for
the sake of the map defined in Eq. (1) being always
chaotic. However, the bifurcation diagram of the logistic
map (Fig. 1) shows the existence of periodic windows
in that interval. It means that a user could choose a
such that the logistic map would be working in a non-
chaotic area, which is not a good security criterium when
considering chaotic cryptosystems [2, Rule 5]. Hence, it is
advisable to give a more detailed definition of the possible
values of a, so that the user can only choose those values
of the control parameter a preventing the logistic map
from showing a periodic behaviour.
FIG. 1: Bifurcation diagram of the logistic map showing pe-
riodic windows.
Finally, the other parts of the key are the number of
iterations of the logistic map per pixel (n) and the num-
ber of encryption cycles (j). As secret sub-keys, both
values should possess a high level of entropy to avoid be-
ing guessed by a possible attacker. However, it is not
advisable to select large values for j and n, since it will
definitely lead to a very slow encryption speed. On the
other hand, using small values of j and n reduces the
level of security, since those small values do not provide
good confusion and diffusion properties. Both restric-
tions imply a reduction of the associated sub-key space
and thus they make the brute-force attack more likely to
be successful. As a conclusion, it is convenient to use j
and n as design parameters and not as part of the secret
key. This approach has been traditionally followed with
respect to the number of encryption rounds in classical
schemes such as DES or AES.
B. Underlying decryption error
As it happens during the encryption procedure, all the
intermediate values xic(r) obtained through the decryp-
tion stage must be inside the phase space. This means
that xmin should appear in Eq. (10) and (11) in [1] in-
stead of 0. Having in mind this consideration, the per-
formance of the decryption process will be analyzed in
the following.
The cryptosystem described in [1] generates a cipher-
text consisting of a number of real values. All the oper-
ations to encrypt an image are performed using floating-
point arithmetic. From Section II we know that xic(r) =
xn+x
i
c(r−1), where xn is the resulting value of iterating
the logistic map n times from x0. Hence, if we want to
3recover xic(r − 1) (the original value of the i-th element
in the last round), we have to iterate n times the logistic
map from x0 to get xn and, after that, to substract this
value from xic(r). However, the resulting value of this
previous operation might not match the actual value of
xic(r − 1), due to the wobbling precision problem that
exists when dealing with floating-point operations [12,
p. 39]. This wobbling precision problem also causes the
resulting guessed value of xic(r − 1) to depend on the
cryptosystem implementation. Therefore, if an image is
encrypted on one platform and decrypted on another,
and the implementations of floating-point arithmetics on
both platforms are not compatible with each other, then
the decrypted image might not match the original one.
In [1] the cryptosystem was implemented using Microsoft
Visual C# .NET 2005 and no comment was given about
the wobbling precision problem in the decryption process.
However, we have experimentally verified that this prob-
lem indeed exists when the cryptosystem is implemented
using MATLAB. A very useful measure of the perfor-
mance of the decryption procedure is the Mean Square
Error or MSE. For P and P ′ being a plain image and
the decrypted image respectively, the MSE for the color
component c is defined as
MSEc =
∑
(P ic − P
′i
c)
2/m, (4)
where m =M ×N is the number of pixels of the images
considered. Consequently, for a well designed encryp-
tion/decryption scheme the MSE should be 0 for each
color component. Unfortunately, for the cryptosystem
under study, the values of MSE for all three color com-
ponents are generally not equal to 0 due to the wobbling
precision problem associated to the floating-point arith-
metic.
In order to evaluate the underlying decryption error
of the cryptosystem defined in [1], a 512 × 512 plain-
image “Lena”, as shown in Fig. 2, was encrypted and
decrypted using the same key (n, j, a) = (30, 1, 3.9). The
results showed that the three MSEs obtained for the red,
green and blue components of the decrypted image with
respect to the original one were 6.49, 0.018, 0.057, re-
spectively. For another key (n, j, a) = (30, 3, 3.9), the
obtained MSEs were 206.96, 123.45, 58.65, respectively.
Figure 3 shows the decrypted image and the error image
when the cryptosystem was implemented in MATLAB
using a third key (n, j, a) = (5, 2, 3.9).
IV. ATTACKS
A. Control parameter estimation
The maximum value of xi+1 in Eq. (1) is reached when
xi = 0.5, which informs that the maximum value of a
sequence generated from the iteration of the logistic map
is a/4, i.e., xmax = max ({xi}) ≤ a/4. The ciphertext
of the cryptosystem proposed in [1] is composed of 3m
FIG. 2: The plain-image “Lena”.
real values, each of which is in the range [xmin, xmax].
This means that it is possible to approximate xmax =
a/4 as the maximum value of all the real values in the
ciphertext, i.e.,
xˆmax = max
1≤i≤m
c=R, G, B
xic(j). (5)
Then, from xmax = a/4, one can estimate the secret value
of the control parameter a as
aˆ = 4 · xˆmax. (6)
Consequently, if we have a ciphertext, we can esti-
mate the value of the sub-key a. In other words, a
ciphertext-only attack allows us to estimate the sub-key
a. In this sense, the image “Lena” (Fig. 2) was encrypted
for n = 20, j = 1 and different values of a ∈ [3.8, 4].
These values of a were then estimated from the cipher-
texts by applying Eqs. (5) and (6). The estimation errors
are shown in Fig. 4. The average estimation error was
5.236228 × 10−6, whereas the maximum and minimum
errors were 3.481322×10−5 and 2.758853×10−8, respec-
tively. By increasing the value of j from 1 to 3 and keep-
ing the other sub-keys unchanged, the parameter estima-
tion errors are shown in Fig. 5, being the mean estimation
error 4.721420×10−6, the minimum error 1.212016×10−8
and the maximum error 3.355227× 10−5.
Finally, in Figs. 6 and 7 the sensitivity of the cryptosys-
tem with respect to the control parameter a is shown.
This sensitivity is measured using the Peak Signal to
Noise Ratio (PSNR), which is defined for the color com-
ponent c as
PSNRc = 10 · log10
(
2552
MSEc
)
. (7)
Figure 6 displays the PSNRs of the different color
components of the decrypted image “Lena” with respect
to the original image “Lena” for a ∈ [3.8, 4] when the
same key is used for encryption and decryption. The
4(a) (b)
(c)
FIG. 3: Simulations with MATLAB (a) Ciphertext of the plain-image “Lena” (visualized as a pseudo-image by using Eq. (3))
(b) Recovered image of “Lena” using the same key (c) The error image between the original and the recovered “Lena”.
values of the other sub-keys are n = 20, j = 3. On
the other hand, Figure 7 shows the PSNRs when the
control parameter used in decryption shows some devia-
tion from that employed in the encryption process. One
can see that for a deviation of the control parameter
of less than 10−10 and for a certain range of values of
the control parameter, it is possible to recover the origi-
nal image “Lena” with a similar PSNR to that obtained
using the correct control parameter. For instance, for
a = 3.845621 the PNSRs for the red, green and blue com-
ponents of the recovered “Lena” are 35.899819, 60.437331
and 63.853450, respectively. For the same value of a and
a parameter estimation error equal to 10−12, the PSNR
of the recovered “Lena” with respect to the original one
is 17.480625 for the red component, 18.622578 for the
green and 20.019512 for the blue component.
B. Timing attack
One important feature of a secure encryption scheme
is that the encryption speed should not depend on the
key value. Indeed, if the time consumed on encryp-
tion/decryption is correlated with the value of the key
(or a sub-key), then it is possible to approximate that
(sub-)key. This kind of attack is called timing attack
[13, 14]. As it has been shown in Section II, in every
encryption round, Step 3 is carried out through the n it-
erations of Eq. (1), where n is a sub-key. This means
that, for a certain number of encryption rounds (i.e.,
a certain value of j) and a certain value of the control
parameter a, the encryption speed decreases as n does.
Similarly, because the encryption/decryption procedure
is composed of j repeated cycles, the encryption speed
will also become slower if the value of j increases. To be
more precise, for a given plain-image, we can expect the
existence of the following bi-linear relationship between
the encryption/decryption time (EDT) and the values of
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FIG. 4: Parameter estimation errors corresponding to the
image “Lena”, when n = 20 and j = 1.
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FIG. 5: Parameter estimation errors corresponding to the
image “Lena”, when n = 20 and j = 3.
n and j:
EDT (n, j) ≈ (c× n+ d0)× j + d1, (8)
where c corresponds to the common operations consumed
on each chaotic iteration, d0 to the operations performed
in each cycle excluding those about chaotic iterations,
and d1 to those operations performed on the initialization
process and the postprocessing after all the j cycles are
completed. In addition, because a is just the control
parameter of the chaotic map, it is expected that EDT
will be independent of its value.
With the aim of verifying this hypothesis, some exper-
iments have been made under the following scenario. An
image with random pixel values of size 256× 256 was en-
crypted for different values of a, n and j. The encryption
time corresponding to each key is shown in Fig. 8, from
which one can see that Eq. (8) is verified.
The above experimental results ensure the feasibility
of a timing attack to a sub-key of the cryptosystem un-
der study: by observing the encryption time, it is pos-
sible to estimate the values of n if j is known and vice
versa. Without loss of generality, assuming an attacker
Eve knows the value of n, but not that of j, let us demon-
strate how the timing attack can be performed in prac-
tice. In this case, the relationship between EDT and the
value of j can be simplified as EDT (n, j) = cn × j + dn,
where cn = c × n and dn = d0 × j + d1. Then, if Eve
gets a temporary access to the encryption (or decryp-
tion) machine, she can carry out a real timing attack in
the following steps:
1. She observes the whole process of encryption (or
decryption) to get the encryption (or decryption)
time tj and also the size of the ciphertext (i.e., the
size of the plaintext).
2. By choosing two keys with different values of j, she
encrypts1 a plaintext (or decrypts a ciphertext) of
the same size and gets t1 and t2.
3. She derives the values of cn and dn by substituting
t1 and t2 into EDT (n, j) = cn × j + dn.
4. She estimates the value of j to be jˆ = round((tj −
dn)/cn).
5. She verifies the estimated value jˆ by using it to
decrypt the observed ciphertext. If the recovered
plaintext is something meaningful, the attack stops;
otherwise, she turns to search the correct value of
j in a small neighborhood of jˆ until a meaningful
plaintext is obtained.
The above timing attack actually reveals that partial
knowledge about the key constitutes useful information
to determine the rest of the key. However, such a prob-
lem should not exist for a well-designed cryptosystem [2,
Rule 7]. Hence, we reach the conclusion that the cryp-
tosystem proposed in [1] was not well designed.
Finally, it deserves being mentioned that the linear
relationship between the encryption/decryption time and
the value of j has been implicitly shown in [1, Table I].
There, for an image of size 300 × 200 and j equal to 1,
2 and 3, the encryption times were observed to be 13.6,
26.7 and 39.1 seconds, respectively. This clearly showed
a linear relationship between the encryption time and
the value of j. Unfortunately, the authors of [1] did not
realize that this is a security defect that could be used to
develop the timing attack reported in this paper.
V. ENHANCEMENTS
To overcome the problems of the original cryptosys-
tem, we propose to enhance it by applying the following
1 Please note that this can be done on her own computer, as long
as she has the encryption/decryption software installed.
63.8 3.85 3.9 3.95
36
36.5
37
37.5
38
a
PS
NR
(a) Red component
3.8 3.85 3.9 3.95
58
60
62
64
66
68
a
PS
NR
(b) Green component
3.8 3.85 3.9 3.95
58
60
62
64
66
68
70
a
PS
NR
(c) Blue component
FIG. 6: PSNRs of the decrypted image “Lena” with respect to different values of the control parameter a.
rules:
• Use a piecewise linear chaotic map (PWLCM) [15]
instead of the logistic map for the size of the chaotic
phase space being independent with respect to the
control parameter value. Indeed, the chaotic phase
space of the PWLCM is (0,1) for all the values
of the control parameter. The PWLCM also has
a uniform invariant probability distribution func-
tion, which makes impossible to estimate the con-
trol parameter through the maximum value of the
ciphertext, as we can do for the cryptosystem under
study.
• The wobbling precision problem should be circum-
vented by forcing fixed-point computations. A pos-
sible solution is to transform the values of the phase
space of the chaotic map into integer values, so the
encryption and decryption operations are carried
out using integer numbers instead of real numbers.
• Without loss of security, the enhanced cryptosys-
tem should be easy to implement with acceptable
cost and speed [2, Rule 3]. It is expected that the
enhanced cryptosystem can encrypt at least a pixel
per iteration to reach high encryption/decryption
speed.
• The key of the enhanced cryptosystem should be
precisely defined [2, Rule 4], and the key space
from which valid keys are chosen should be pre-
cisely specified and avoid non-chaotic regions [2,
Rule 5]. This can be assured by choosing the con-
trol parameter(s) of a PWLCM as the secret key,
because for every valid control parameter, the be-
havior of the PWLCM is chaotic.
• Having in mind today’s computer speed, the key
space size should be κ > 2100 = 1030 in order
to elude brute-force attacks [2, Rule 15]. In the
encryption scheme defined in [1] every color com-
ponent is encrypted independently from the other
color components. Nevertheless, the secret key em-
ployed in the encryption process of each color com-
ponent is the same. It is convenient to use a dif-
ferent value of the key for each color component
and make the encryption of the three color compo-
nents dependent on each other, since this implies a
considerable increase of the key space. It has been
tested that the sensitivity of the PWLCM with re-
spect to the control parameter is around 10−10.
Therefore, when the control parameter is used as
the key of the cryptosystem, the size of the key
space will be κ = 1010. Nonetheless, if we use a dif-
ferent value of p for every color component, and the
encryption of each color component depends on the
others, the size of the key space will be κ = 1030,
which satisfies the security requirement related to
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FIG. 7: PSNRs of the decrypted image “Lena” with respect to different values of the control parameter a and different parameter
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the resistance against brute-force attacks.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, some problems of a new image encryp-
tion scheme based on chaotic map lattices are reported
and two attacks on this cryptosystem have been pre-
sented. To overcome these problems and weaknesses,
we have introduced some countermeasures to enhance
the cryptosystem by following the cryptographical rules
listed in [2].
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